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Summary 
In this chapter, we review empirical data and theoretical models which have been put 
forward in the affective science literature to account for the perception of emotions, 
when this process is simultaneously accomplished by sight and hearing. The visual 
component is provided by the face configuration that undergoes some geometric 
changes, which in turn lead to different and discrete emotion facial expressions. The 
auditory component is provided by the voice and its changes in pitch, duration and/or 
intensity leading to different affective tones of voice. Face-voice integration during 
emotion perception occurs when affective information conveyed by the two sensory 
modalities is integrated into a unified percept, or multisensory object. Although one may 
assume that the rapid and mandatory combination of multiple or complementary 
affective cues is adaptive (i.e. it likely reduces the effects of adverse factors like drifts or 
intrinsic noise), the central nervous system must however show some selectivity 
regarding which inputs from separate senses may eventually combine, as compared 
with merely redundant emotion signals. Indeed, not all spatial or temporal coincidences 
or co-occurrences lead to the perception of unified objects. Interestingly, results of 
behavioral studies confirm this conjecture, and indicate that the combination of 
emotional facial expressions with affective prosody leads to the creation of genuinely 
multisensory emotional objects, which show different properties compared to the 
combination of an emotional facial expression with another redundant or distracting 
emotional facial expression, or an emotion written word. Hence, the findings and models 
reviewed in this chapter suggest that some selectivity can be found in the way visual 
and auditory information is actually combined during emotion perception. The rapid and 
automatic paring of an emotional face with an affective voice might present a naturalistic 
situation in the sense that there is no need for mediation by higher-level cognitive, 
attentional or linguistic processes, which may be necessary for the efficient decoding of 
other stimulus categories or multisensory objects. 
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1 General Introduction 
The perception of emotions in conspecifics stands out as one of the most important 
social skills in human cognition (Darwin, 1871, 1872; Frijda, 1989; A.R. Damasio, 1994). 
Yet, emotion perception is a complex phenomenon, as affective information is usually 
processed and conveyed concurrently by multiple sensory channels. Not only the 
muscles innervating the face swiftly change their configurations to convey or 
communicate a specific emotional expression, but also the tone of voice as well as the 
gait or body posture undergo compatible dynamic alterations to promote the efficient 
expression, communication, as well as decoding by conspecifics, of this emotion. Such 
emotional multisensory stimulations are the rule rather than the exception in natural 
environments (De Gelder & Bertelson, 2003), yet still very little is known about the 
actual brain mechanisms and cognitive processes underlying this remarkable 
perceptual ability, despite a clear recrudescence of empirical contributions in the field of 
Multisensory Integration since 10 years (Foxe & Molholm, 2009).    
This scarcity is probably related to the fact that one of the dominant paradigms in 
emotion research is the cognitive approach (Fodor, 1983), which by definition seeks to 
decompose or break down complex mental functions (including emotion perception) into 
elementary or basic processes or principles, hence providing a strong analytical (as 
opposed to integrative) bias. Accordingly, emotion perception has mostly been studied 
in social or cognitive sciences by looking at mental processes or brain functions 
concerning a specific, isolated sensory modality (with a clear preference or advantage 
for vision, relative to the other senses), as opposed to systematic investigations 
exploring how multiple sensory cues are actually integrated during emotion perception. 
This observation does not imply that the cognitive approach makes the detailed study of 
multisensory integration almost impossible, but the modular and analytical perspective 
embraced by this dominant approach is sometimes hardly compatible with the fact that 
object-based multisensory perception is by essence a complex, permeable and non-
encapsulated phenomenon, which does not necessarily obey to laws of organization 
that have been put forward primarily to account for modality-specific processes, like 
visual computations during object recognition or semantic processing during speech 
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perception for instance. Consistent with this conjecture, many studies have been 
designed to better characterize mechanisms of emotion perception when the affective 
information is conveyed predominantly by the face only (Ekman, 1992; Ekman & 
Friesen, 1976), or by the voice only (Banse & Scherer, 1996; Osullivan, Ekman, 
Friesen, & Scherer, 1985; K. R. Scherer, Banse, & Wallbott, 2001), but by comparison, 
few studies have been carried out to look at the nature and extent of perceptual effects 
when both channels (face and voice) are concurrently conveying important social or 
emotional signals, and they eventually interact with one another to yield a unified 
emotion percept (Massaro & Egan, 1996; De Gelder & Vroomen, 2000; Campanella & 
Belin, 2007). Likewise, studies looking at correlations between emotion face, affective 
voice and emotion word perception do exist and have been performed in the past (e.g. 
Borod et al., 1998; Borod et al., 2000), but these valuable studies suggesting the likely 
existence of amodal perceptual mechanisms during emotion perception do not directly 
address the question of how multiple sensory cues (e.g. face and voice) may be 
integrated during emotion perception, and what the resulting emotion percept may be. 
To address this complex question, another methodology and experimental approach, 
going beyond correlation methods, is required.  
Presumably, an emotion is eventually perceived and experienced as such when these 
modality specific signals are combined and integrated together to yield a unified 
multimodal percept. What are the rules or constraints, if any, of this multisensory 
integration during emotion perception? Does multisensory integration of emotions 
represent another instance of stimulus redundancy (Marzi, Tassinari, Aglioti, & 
Lutzemberger, 1986; Miniussi, Girelli, & Marzi, 1998), or is there anything distinctive to 
this audio-visual integration process? The research presented in this chapter addresses 
these fundamental questions. Yet, the goal of this chapter is not to study emotions per 
se (see Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007; Brosch, Pourtois, & Sander, 2010 for recent 
reviews), but rather to shed light on mechanisms allowing the perceptual system to bind 
together affective information conveyed concurrently by multiple sensory channels. The 
focus is limited to visual and auditory information, and we do not consider other sensory 
inputs, like non-linguistic signals (e.g. vocalizations, see Morris, Scott, & Dolan, 1999; 
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Panksepp, 2005; Scott et al., 1997), emotional body language or gait (de Gelder, 2006), 
which also accompany expression of emotions.  
The visual component is provided by the face configuration that undergoes some 
changes, which can eventually lead to different discrete emotional facial expressions 
(Mckelvie, 1995). Note however that unlike person identity information (Tanaka & Farah, 
1993), it is still debated whether facial expression perception actually relies on the 
configuration of the face (as a whole), or instead the selective perceptual processing of 
some diagnostic faces parts, including the mouth and the eyes (see deGelder, 
Teunisse, & Benson, 1997; Smith, Cottrell, Gosselin, & Schyns, 2005; Adolphs et al., 
2005). In any case, it can be argued that in some cases at least, affect-relevant 
information from the face is carried by the whole facial configuration (see deGelder et 
al., 1997), and this is the assumption adopted in our work. The auditory component is 
provided by the voice and its subtle changes in pitch, duration or intensity/loudness 
when articulating and producing speech sounds or fragments, which may lead to 
different discrete affective tones of voice. The respective contribution of variations in 
these psycho-acoustical parameters has been measured in natural or simulated 
affective speech (Cummings & Clements, 1995; Lieberman & Michaels, 1962; Williams 
& Stevens, 1972; K. Scherer, 1989). Many prosodic features contribute to the 
expression of vocal emotions, and it seems evident that the acoustic correlates are 
subject to large inter-individual differences (see Lieberman & Michaels, 1962). Despite 
the large inter-speaker variability, there is some general consensus that if prosodic 
features are ranked in terms of their respective contribution, then gross changes in pitch 
do contribute most to the transmission of emotions, duration is intermediate whereas 
loudness seems to be least important (Frick, 1985; I. R. Murray & Arnott, 1993), even if 
the simultaneous processing and integration of these different parameters is probably 
required to efficiently decode the emotion from the voice. Noteworthy, the manipulation 
of affective speech prosody can be done independently of the semantic content 
conveyed in the message and this is why the prosodic channel can be considered to be 
a separate channel. Hence, the primary goal is to explore the nature of the relationship 
unifying a given emotional face expression and a concurrent (either compatible or not) 
6 
 
affective tone of voice. We refer to this integration effect as “multisensory perception of 
emotion”, following standard practice (see de Gelder, Vroomen, & Pourtois, 2004).  
This chapter is divided into two main and consecutive sections. In the first part, we 
review some classical empirical evidence and dominant theoretical frameworks that 
have been put forward in the cognitive sciences literature to account for multisensory 
perception in general, and multisensory perception of emotion more specifically. In the 
second part, we present new (unpublished) behavioral empirical data addressing the 
selectivity of multisensory perception of emotion. Several experiments were carried out 
to assess if the integration of face (emotional expression) and voice (affective tone of 
voice) during emotion perception may be somehow specific, relative to other forms of 
stimulus redundancy (e.g. two emotional faces shown simultaneously, relative to a 
single emotional face). The results of these experiments somehow enable to better 
demarcate the constraints on bimodal sensory inputs which have to be met to 
eventually yield genuine behavioral effects of multisensory perception of emotion.  
2 Object-based multisensory perception 
2.1 Introduction 
We restrict our review to what is usually referred to as object-based multisensory 
perception (Lehmann & Murray, 2005). As it turns out, multisensory perception of 
emotion can be considered as an instance of multisensory object recognition, and is 
similar to many other cases of object perception where convergent information about 
the same object is presented through different sensory modalities. As a first 
approximation, the kinds of audio-visual objects that have been mostly studied appear 
to be of two categories: simple/arbitrary audio-visual pairings vs. complex/natural 
pairings (see Pourtois & de Gelder, 2002). A common example of simple audio-visual 
pairings is the combination of light flashes with tone bursts, or the combination of 
specific tone frequencies with simple geometric figures (Stein & Meredith, 1993; Giard & 
Peronnet, 1999; Fuster, Bodner, & Kroger, 2000; Talsma, Senkowski, Soto-Faraco, & 
Woldorff, 2010). Such pairings are obviously arbitrary and usually the subject is trained 
intensively to associate them, and later perceive them as paired in the context of the 
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experiment. The situation is quite different with more complex audio-visual pairs 
consisting of speech sounds and lip movements, or facial emotional expressions and 
affective tones of voice (De Gelder & Bertelson, 2003; Campanella & Belin, 2007). 
These complex pairings are natural, as they do not require any training for the perceiver 
to treat these pairs as such in the laboratory. In fact, in the course of studying these 
pairings naturally associated (e.g. an emotional facial expression combined with an 
affective tone of voice), the experimenter may even create conditions allowing pulling 
them apart and dissociating them (see Mcgurk & Macdonald, 1976; De Gelder & 
Vroomen, 2000). This is often done in order to obtain incongruent pairs and compare 
them with the more natural situation of congruence. Natural and arbitrary pairs thus 
seems to pull the researchers in opposite directions, to some extent, and it is plausible 
to argue that the underlying multisensory integration processes may be different 
depending on whether the audio-visual pairs are natural, or rather arbitrary (see 
Pourtois & de Gelder, 2002 for evidence).  
Object-based multisensory perception is widespread in daily environments. However, 
there are only a few multisensory objects that have been studied in depth so far in 
cognitive sciences. Space perception, language perception and the perception of 
temporal events are three domains of human cognition where multisensory research 
has brought valuable insight. In the domain of space perception, many multisensory or 
crossmodal effects have been shown previously that all reflect our ability to integrate 
spatial information when this information is concurrently provided by the visual and 
auditory (or proprioceptive or tactile) modality (Driver & Spence, 1998a, 1998b, 2000). 
For example, the distance between spatially disparate auditory and visual stimuli tends 
to be underestimated with temporally coincident presentations, a phenomenon known 
as the ventriloquist effect/illusion (Bermant & Welch, 1976; Bertelson, 1999). Visual 
capture is another instance found in the spatial domain (Hay, Pick, & Ikeda, 1965). It 
involves a spatial localization situation in which the visual information is in conflict with 
that of another modality, namely proprioceptive information, and perceived location is 
determined predominantly by visual information. Likewise, when speech sounds 
(syllables) are presented simultaneously with incongruent lip movements, subjects 
report a percept that neither belongs to the visual modality, nor to the auditory one, but 
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that represents either a fusion or combination between the two inputs (Mcgurk & 
Macdonald, 1976). These results indicate that the visual and auditory components of 
syllables do combine and this combination translates as a new speech percept. Natural 
speech perception therefore provides a compelling case of multisensory integration 
(Dodd & Campbell, 1987). A third compelling instance or illusion of object-based 
multisensory integration is found in the temporal domain and may be seen, to some 
degree, as a symmetric case to that observed with the ventriloquist illusion. Here a 
visual illusion is induced by sound (Shams, Kamitani, & Shimojo, 2000). When a single 
flash of light is accompanied by multiple auditory beeps, the single flash is perceived as 
multiple flashes. This phenomenon is partly consistent with previous behavioral results 
that showed that sound can alter the visually perceived direction of motion (Sekuler, 
Sekuler, & Lau, 1997). Altogether, these effects suggest that visual perception is 
malleable by signals from other sensory modalities, such as auditory perception is 
malleable by signals from other sensory modalities. More generally, the dominance of 
one modality over the other does not seem therefore to be fixed or absolute, but instead 
may depend upon the context in which crossmodal effects take place. For space 
perception, the visual modality dominates over the auditory, and this situation is 
reversed during the perception of discrete temporal events (for which the auditory 
domain takes the lead on visual cues).               
Traditionally, two sets of constraints have been envisaged in the literature (Bertelson, 
1999). The first, referred to as structural factors, primarily concerns the spatial and 
temporal properties of the sensory inputs. The other set, often discussed as cognitive 
factors, is related to a whole set of higher-level, semantic or attention-related factors, 
including the subject’s knowledge of, and familiarity with the multisensory situation 
(Talsma et al., 2010). Structural factors are the ones that have attracted by far the most 
attention from researchers in the field of multisensory integration (see G.A. Calvert, 
Spence, & Stein, 2004). By comparison, the role of cognitive factors is still under-
investigated, although more recent work has started to explore the links between 
selective attention brain mechanisms and multisensory integration brain processes (see 
Talsma et al., 2010). However, from a conceptual viewpoint, it seems plausible to argue 
that some additional cognitive or object-based constraints on multisensory perception 
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actually take place, to prevent the organism to register many invalid and spurious 
incidences of multimodality, as solely defined based on the spatial and temporal 
coincidences of the visual and auditory inputs. Yet, there are only a few studies that 
have addressed this question, and tested to which extent object-based constraints may 
influence mechanisms of multisensory perception (see Pourtois & de Gelder, 2002; De 
Gelder & Bertelson, 2003).   
Object-based multisensory perception is a complex issue, since beyond the spatial and 
temporal determinants of the input, the nature of the object to perceive may vary a lot 
from one condition (or encounter) to another. In this context, one may consider 
emotions just as one class of perceptual objects, besides other categories like speech 
(i.e. speech sounds presented simultaneously with lipread information/lip movements, 
see Mcgurk & Macdonald, 1976; G. A. Calvert et al., 1997) or space (i.e. although 
spatial localization is determined predominantly by visual cues, the presentation of 
concurrent spatial auditory or tactile cues strongly bias and influence visual spatial 
localization abilities, see Stein & Meredith, 1993; Driver & Spence, 1998a; Bertelson, 
1999), as reviewed here above. Several objects or dimensions are actually susceptible 
to being perceived by multiple sensory channels at the same time, and therefore a 
central (still unanswered) question concerns the existence of general principles that 
would govern multisensory perception. Structural factors, such as temporal and spatial 
coincidence (see Stein & Meredith, 1993), may be envisaged as such. On the other 
hand and contrary to this view, one might postulate that each domain or object of 
perception (e.g. emotion, speech, space) actually possesses its own organization 
principles and that the overlap between these domains is fairly limited. Presumably, 
multisensory perception of emotion most likely shares some invariance in the basic 
perceptual mechanisms of audio-visual integration with these other domains (speech 
and space perception), while some specificity may well be present, although this 
question still remains open. 
2.2 Multisensory perception: behavioral effects and cognitive models 
In behavioral research on audio-visual integration, a few classical models have been 
proposed (Miller, 1982, 1986; Massaro, 1998; Bertelson, 1999; Dodd & Campbell, 1987; 
10 
 
De Gelder & Bertelson, 2003). The behavioral measures on the basis of which audio-
visual integration is inferred are predominantly accuracy and response latency. When 
participants respond better and faster to the bimodal (audio-visual) stimulus than to 
either the visual only or auditory only stimulus, there is evidence that the response is 
presumably based on multisensory integration (Giard & Peronnet, 1999; Talsma et al., 
2010). However, this evidence is inevitably indirect, and other accounts, like for 
example a race model (Raab, 1962) that do not assume integration of the two separate 
modality inputs can in principle still explain the same pattern of behavioral results. 
Although multisensory integration intuitively refers to the notion that the brain combines 
different input modalities, it is actually a theoretical notion advanced in order to account 
for a wide range of (behavioral) observations showing that there are bi-directional 
interaction effects between different sensory modalities. Traditionally, faster RTs for 
bimodal stimulus pairs than unimodal stimuli is compatible with the Redundant Signal 
Effect (RSE, see Miller, 1982, 1986). If an RSE is obtained for (congruent) audio-visual 
stimulus pairs, it does not necessarily mean that audio-visual integration (or neural 
interaction) occurs (Miller, 1986), however. Firstly, RSEs are also obtained with 
redundant stimuli presented in the same modality. The RSE is therefore not specific to 
multisensory perception, and is also found in spatial summation experiments in which a 
redundant simple visual stimulus (e.g. the simultaneous and synchronous presentation 
of the same simple visual stimulus at two separate spatial positions, usually on each 
side in the visual field to allow callosal interhemispheric transfer) is detected faster than 
a non-redundant visual stimulus, an effect classically referred to as Redundant Target 
Effect (RTE, see Marzi et al., 1986; Miniussi et al., 1998; M. M. Murray, Foxe, Higgins, 
Javitt, & Schroeder, 2001; de Gelder, Pourtois, van Raamsdonk, Vroomen, & 
Weiskrantz, 2001; Savazzi & Marzi, 2002, 2004, 2008; Turatto, Mazza, Savazzi, & 
Marzi, 2004). Secondly, faster RTs for (congruent) bimodal stimulus pairs (relative to 
unimodal stimuli) could be explained by a horse race model that does not imply 
interaction between sensory modalities (Raab, 1962), as briefly explained here above. 
In this perspective, each stimulus of a pair independently competes for response 
initiation and the faster of the two mediates the response. Thus, “simple” probability (or 
statistical) summation could yield the RSE. Indeed, the likelihood of either of two stimuli 
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yielding a fast RT is higher than that from one (unisensory) stimulus alone. On the other 
hand, RSE could also be explained by a co-activation model that implies that the two 
modalities are integrated together and interact prior to motor response initiation (Miller, 
1982). In order to distinguish between these two opposite accounts (race model vs. co-
activation model), Miller (1982) proposed to analyze RTs using cumulative probability 
functions and to test for what he called the inequality assumption. The inequality places 
an upper limit on the cumulative probability of RTs at a given latency for a stimulus pair. 
For any latency, t, the race model holds when the cumulative probability value is less 
than or equal to the sum of the cumulative probabilities from each of the single stimulus 
minus an expression of their joint probability. Hence, based on a formal analysis of RT 
distribution (and the violation of the inequality assumption, or not, see Miller, 1982, 
1986), it is possible to establish whether a simple statistical facilitation/summation, or 
instead a co-activation (integration) between the two modalities (or sensory inputs) 
occurs during the processing of bimodal stimulus pairs (see Molholm et al., 2002 for an 
example).   
Besides these important technical considerations related to the definition or qualification 
of multisensory perception effects, in fact, very few (computational) models have been 
developed in the literature to account for these multisensory behavioral effects. Notably, 
the Fuzzy Logical Model of Perception (FLMP, see Massaro, 1987; Massaro, 1998) 
represents such a valuable attempt. The key assumption behind the model of Massaro 
is that sensory information is always processed the same way, whatever the domain of 
application. In this perspective, audio-visual integration is just one instance of 
perception besides other cases and the underlying mechanisms responsible for audio-
visual perception are similar to the mechanisms involved in other domains of cognition 
or perception. To validate his model, Massaro has provided data on bimodal speech 
perception from children, elderly, hearing impaired or bimodal emotion perception that 
all fit the FLMP (see also Massaro & Egan, 1996). This is an apparent strength of this 
computational model: this model is able to describe a wide range of human 
performance patterns during audio-visual perception. However, a possible downside is 
that the FLMP remains only descriptive, because this model does not implement any 
pre-conception about the nature of the components it seeks to describe (see Burnham, 
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1999). In the FLMP, four sequential stages of processing are postulated. The first step 
is feature evaluation, which is assumed to be carried out independently and separately 
for each modality source. The second stage is an integration of the features available 
after the first stage. This is of course the stage of interest, with regards to mechanisms 
of multisensory integration. Integration is achieved through a multiplicative combination 
of the response strengths of components of information input. Then, the result of this 
integration is matched against a prototype stored in memory during the assessment 
stage. Finally, a response is selected based on the most consistent prototype, given the 
visual and auditory cues. The proposal of a first evaluation stage carried out separately 
for each modality source is debated, and does not agree with independent evidence 
from neuroimaging or neurophysiology work showing reliable crossmodal effects not 
only in multimodal or heteromodal brain regions (A. R. Damasio, 1989; Mesulam, 1998; 
Pourtois, de Gelder, Bol, & Crommelinck, 2005; Ethofer, Pourtois, & Wildgruber, 2006), 
but also (and already) in unisensory or modality-specific cortices (see G. A. Calvert et 
al., 1999; Macaluso, Frith, & Driver, 2000; G. A. Calvert, 2001). Moreover, this 
independence of the auditory and visual components during audio-visual perception has 
been called into question, at least for the case of speech perception. An alternative 
account is the possibility of intermodal cues (see Campbell, Dodd, & Burnham, 1998). 
Another controversial property of the first evaluation step is related to the nature of the 
representations that drive this process. Indeed, in this model (Massaro, 1998), the 
algorithm of perception tags each feature with a continuous value and this characteristic 
runs against several empirical data that showed a categorical perception function during 
speech perception (see Liberman, Harris, Hoffman, & Griffith, 1957). Despite these 
critiques or limitations, the FLMP undoubtedly provides one of the few valuable 
computational models aimed at describing the critical computations involved during the 
perception and later integration of visual and auditory cues when presented 
simultaneously (object-based multisensory integration). 
2.3 Multisensory perception effects revealed using the crossmodal paradigm                       
Several methods have been used to disclose, at the behavioral level, evidence of 
object-based multisensory perception. A classical method that we have used in this 
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work, is referred to as the crossmodal paradigm (see Bertelson, 1999). This specific 
paradigm is actually part of a larger sets of methods, used to indirectly measure the 
impact of stimulus processing in one sensory modality onto another. Other indirect 
methods include the use of after-effects (see Held, 1965), intersensory fusions (Mcgurk 
& Macdonald, 1976) or staircases (Bertelson, 1999).  
The crossmodal paradigm is reminiscent of older studies on intermodal discrepancy 
following prismatic adaptation (Hay et al., 1965), on audio-visual space perception 
(Bermant & Welch, 1976), and has been used in audio-visual speech studies (Driver, 
1996; Massaro, 1987, 1998) and in crossmodal attention studies (Driver & Spence, 
1998a). In this paradigm, the systematic influence of one modality on the other is 
assessed using a strict methodology that requires a narrowing of the subject’s 
attentional resources to one modality only, during stimulus processing. Then, a relative 
“automatic” crossmodal bias effect from the unattended modality to the attended 
modality can be measured. Therefore, the impact of one modality on the other is 
measured indirectly in the crossmodal paradigm. This procedure offers a double 
methodological advantage. Firstly, it has been shown to be more sensitive than direct 
measures and this procedure is better suited than other methodologies to capture 
genuine perceptual, as opposed to post-perceptual effects (see Bertelson, 1999). 
Secondly, it allows to manipulate the level or amount of congruence between the two 
modalities, unlike other contrasting methods capitalizing solely on the direct comparison 
between unidmodal and multimodal stimulus conditions (see Giard & Peronnet, 1999; 
Molholm et al., 2002). Hence, the experimenter may use this powerful method and set 
up in the laboratory artificial conditions in which the level of congruence between the 
two sensory modalities systematically or parametrically varies (see De Gelder & 
Vroomen, 2000). This method enables quantification of the actual crossmodal impact 
from one modality onto the other (e.g. from vision to audition, or vice versa) during the 
perception of bimodal stimulus pairs, including the combination of an emotional facial 
expression with an affective tone of voice (see Pourtois et al., 2005; Pourtois, de 
Gelder, Vroomen, Rossion, & Crommelinck, 2000; Pourtois, Debatisse, Despland, & de 
Gelder, 2002), as reviewed in the next section. 
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3 Multisensory perception of emotion 
3.1 Possible functions of multisensory perception of emotion 
The fact that emotional information concurrently presented in different sensory 
modalities is integrated is likely to occur for reasons that go far beyond a simple back-
up function allowing the system to overcome a given sensory loss and to rely on the 
spared/redundant modality to continue to operate. At least three distinct arguments or 
points can be evoked to support the functionality and need for integration during 
multisensory perception of emotion.  
A first support for functionality comes from several older developmental studies (see 
Lewkowicz, 2000) that have clearly shown that very young infants look longer at face 
stimuli accompanied by voices (see Haith, Bergman, & Moore, 1977). Five to seven-
month-old infants also look longer at a face that carries the same expression as the 
voice than at a face carrying a different expression (Walker & Grolnick, 1983). These 
results suggest that the recognition of affective expressions may be first multimodal, 
before a differentiation occurs between the face and the voice (Walker-Andrews, 1997). 
There would be an ontogenetic priority in favor of multisensory perception. Furthermore, 
these results suggest a possible modular organization for audio-visual perception of 
emotion, which is not consistent with a simple back-up function.  
The second element is that each sense (here the visual and the auditory channel) 
actually provides a qualitatively distinct subjective impression of the environment, 
including emotion perception. Although referring to the same event (e.g. an angry 
affective state), the emotion conveyed by ear (voice of wrath) and by eye (a furious 
facial expression) is not simply redundant but both senses complement each other 
given the specificity and specialization of each sense (de Gelder, Vroomen, & Pourtois, 
1999). This argument is therefore about the sensory specificity and complementary of 
multisensory perception of emotion.  
A third defense for the importance of the function of multisensory perception of emotion 
is the optimization. Indeed, multisensory perception of emotion consists of enhancing 
detection and discrimination of emotions, as well as speed responsiveness to these 
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highly relevant biological stimuli (Sander, Grafman, & Zalla, 2003). The fact that the 
perception of emotions is by nature multimodal and audio-visual, allows the perceptual 
system to disambiguate the actual functional meaning of the emotional input using a 
stable amodal or supramodal representation (see Farah, Wong, Monheit, & Morrow, 
1989; Borod et al., 2000). There are large inter-individual differences between human 
beings (as well as animals) in the ability to express and perceive different emotions. 
Moreover, humans have numerous ways to express and perceive the same emotion. As 
a consequence, the rapid and automatic combination of different channels of 
communication probably acts as an optimizer or catalyzer to rapidly perceive and 
efficiently recognize a given emotional state or object. From an evolutionary perspective 
(see also A.R. Damasio, 1994), integration of multiple affective inputs across different 
sensory modalities makes adaptive sense, given the enhanced biological significance of 
emotional stimuli. It also makes sense, given the fact that combining different sources of 
information (face and voice) usually leads to more accurate and faster judgments, as 
well as more appropriate behaviors, as stressed in the second section of this chapter 
here below. However, this compensatory function may not be specific to multisensory 
perception of emotions, and could also explain other multisensory perceptual 
phenomena, like crossmodal spatial mechanisms at stake during the ventriloquist 
illusion for instance (Bertelson, 1999).  
3.2 Behavioral evidence for multisensory perception of emotion  
In their seminal study, de Gelder and Vroomen (2000) performed a series of elegant 
behavioral experiments looking at crossmodal effects from the voice to the face, and 
vice versa, during emotion perception (see also Massaro & Egan, 1996). These authors 
used an experimental situation in which varying degrees of (in)congruence were created 
between emotional facial expression and affective tone of voice. Two contrasting 
emotions (happy vs. sad) in the voice were manipulated. The same sentence (with a 
neutral semantic content) was uttered by a semi-professional actor, either with a happy 
or sad tone of voice. Using a standard morphing technique (see Etcoff & Magee, 1992; 
Beale & Keil, 1995; deGelder et al., 1997), a visual continuum of varying emotional 
facial expression with 11 steps starting from one emotion at one extreme (happy) and 
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going to another emotion (sad) at the other extreme was created. In the two first 
experiments, de Gelder and Vroomen (2000) combined the 11 faces with the two 
auditory conditions and compared these pairings to the condition where the morphed 
faces were presented alone (no accompanying sound). The task of the participant was 
to judge the emotion (Experiment 1) or to judge the emotion conveyed by the face 
(happy vs. sad) while ignoring the concurrent voice (Experiment 2). Results clearly 
showed that the identification of the emotion in the face was categorical (see Etcoff & 
Magee, 1992; Beale & Keil, 1995; deGelder et al., 1997), but more importantly was 
systematically biased in the direction of the simultaneously presented affective tone of 
voice. More specifically, this effect consisted in the fact that the likelihood to give a sad 
response when judging the emotional face (along the continuum) was reduced if the 
face was paired with a happy voice, regardless of the amount of sadness perceived in 
the face (i.e. general lateral shift of the psychometric response function). Moreover, RT 
results also showed that congruent bimodal stimulus pairs were judged faster than 
either incongruent stimulus pairs or single-modality stimuli (i.e. faces only). 
Another question addressed in this study was whether this crossmodal bias effect 
during emotion perception could also be obtained from the face to the voice, or only 
from the voice to the face as reviewed here above. Were these crossmodal bias effects 
during emotion perception bidirectional and symmetric? In a third experiment, de Gelder 
and Vroomen (2000) directly addressed this question and created for this purpose a 
symmetric situation where the crossmodal impact from the face to the voice during 
emotion perception could be measured and assessed. They created a symmetric 
experiment to Experiment 2 in which a 7-steps voice continuum between two extreme 
emotions (fear vs. happy) was made up. Like was the case for the visual continuum 
used in the first two experiments, a vocal continuum was created using a computer-
assisted auditory morphing procedure, by manipulating in a parametric fashion the 
physical distance between several features of the voices. This sophisticated procedure 
essentially works out on a modeling and subsequent parametric modulation of the 
fundamental frequency (F0) of the two original auditory fragments (fear voice and happy 
voice, see Vroomen, Collier, & Mozziconacci, 1993). Changing simultaneously and 
parametrically the duration, pitch range and pitch register of the two original utterances 
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allowed to create several discrete steps along a vocal continuum, progressively going 
from one emotion (happy) to the other (fear). These seven voice fragments were then 
combined with two facial expressions (fearful vs. happy) to yield 14 stimulus pairs with 
varying levels of emotion (in)congruence. In this experiment, participants were 
instructed to judge the emotion conveyed by the voice, while ignoring (though attending 
to) the face information. Results showed a systematic bias of emotional voice 
identification by the concurrent facial expression, as well as a RT facilitation for 
congruent bimodal stimulus pairs, relative to incongruent bimodal pairs. Altogether, 
these results suggest bidirectional (from face to voice and vice versa) crossmodal bias 
effects during emotion perception. 
Although certainly convincing, these behavioral results (De Gelder & Vroomen, 2000) 
are also compatible with other explanations that do not postulate any access to the 
emotional content of the face or the voice in order to trigger the crossmodal bias effect 
during emotion perception. For example, one may speculate that the crossmodal bias 
effect from the face to the voice during emotion perception described here above  may 
not be specific to the affective content of the face, but instead may be obtained with any 
other visual stimuli that have an affective content. Hence, an important additional 
evidence would be to show that the actual (covert) processing of the affective 
information from the emotional face is crucial in order to obtain a reliable crossmodal 
bias effect (from the face to the voice) during emotion perception. This question was 
addressed in a different study and the results basically confirmed this hypothesis (De 
Gelder, Vroomen, & Bertelson, 1998). Presenting emotional faces upside down disrupts 
the perceptual processing of the emotional facial expression (Mckelvie, 1995; deGelder 
et al., 1997). Based on this face inversion effect for emotional facial expressions, de 
Gelder et al. (1998) surmised that the crossmodal bias effect from the face to the voice 
would be strongly attenuated with the presentation of inverted, relative to upright 
emotional facial expressions. Results of this study confirmed this prediction, as when 
subjects were asked to identify the emotional tone of voice in the presence of inverted 
emotional facial expressions, the crossmodal bias effect from the face to the voice 
basically disappeared, whereas it was still well present when these faces were 
presented upright (see also De Gelder & Vroomen, 2000). These behavioral results 
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suggest that the crossmodal bias effect (from the face to the voice) during emotion 
perception is a function of the expression conveyed by the face. More generally, these 
findings add support to the notion that crossmodal affective biases are to some extent 
automatic and perceptual in nature, and they cannot be easily reduced to some post-
perceptual voluntary adjustments.        
3.3 A role  for attention in multisensory perception of emotion?  
These findings indicate that these crossmodal effects during emotion perception are 
likely to be perceptual, mandatory and automatic, as opposed to post-perceptual (e.g. 
response bias) or influenced by attention, subjective beliefs or decision processes (see 
Bertelson, 1999). Indeed, the fact that this systematic crossmodal influence was 
observed even when participants were instructed to voluntarily ignore one of the two 
sensory modalities seems to indicate that multisensory integration of affective 
information takes place “automatically” to some extent, regardless of attentional factors. 
This property (i.e. independence from demands on attentional capacity) has long been 
one of the defining characteristics of “automatic” processes (see Kahneman, 1973; 
Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977, but see Moors & De Houwer, 2006 for a more recent and 
refined theoretical account of “automaticity”). To some degree, this observation is also 
consistent with the notion that the integration between an emotional facial expression 
and an affective tone of voice is occurring at a pre-attentive level (see also Driver, 
1996), as demonstrated using other investigation techniques, like the recording of 
event-related brain potentials in healthy adult participants, which suggest early 
perceptual effects within modality-specific cortices during multisensory perception of 
emotion (see Pourtois et al., 2000; Pourtois et al., 2002). This audio-visual integration of 
emotional signals could take place during an early perceptual stage of stimulus 
processing, before (selective) attention comes into play (Talsma et al., 2010). 
On the other hand, strict perceptual properties associated with multisensory perception 
of emotion may appear unlikely, given the fact that recognition of emotion stands as a 
particularly content-rich process, and seems more akin to higher-level cognition than 
perception. In this context, the (multisensory) perception of emotion should make a poor 
candidate for qualifying as a case of perception-based audio-visual integration. Yet, 
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there is a wealth of recent empirical studies (including in brain-imaging) that have 
brought support to the notion that emotion perception and recognition (at least for some 
specific emotions like fear or anger) is a true perceptual process, or at least has a hard 
perceptual core (see Calder, Lawrence, & Young, 2001; Pourtois, Grandjean, Sander, & 
Vuilleumier, 2004; Vuilleumier, 2005; Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco, 2006; Bocanegra & 
Zeelenberg, 2009a, 2009b; see also chapter by Kreifelts, Wildgruber and Ethofer in this 
book). Hence, multisensory perception of emotion is likely to rely on genuine perceptual 
mechanisms, which allow a pre-attentive binding of affective information simultaneously 
conveyed by multiple sensory cues (visual and auditory). Indirect evidence obtained in 
specific brain-damaged patients also lent support to this conclusion (i.e. multisensory 
perception of emotion is a perceptual process). In one of these neuropsychology 
studies, two patients with selective striate cortex damages but unaware low-level 
residual visual abilities (“Blindsight”, see Weiskrantz, 1986) were nevertheless shown to 
benefit partly from the presentation of an emotional visual stimulus (either a face or a 
scene) in their blind visual field during multisensory integration of emotion (i.e. this 
visual stimulus for which they therefore remained unaware had nonetheless a reliable 
crossmodal influence on the processing of a concurrent affective tone of voice, see de 
Gelder, Pourtois, & Weiskrantz, 2002). These results speak for multisensory integration 
mechanisms occurring without attention, possibly even without (visual) stimulus 
awareness (see also de Gelder, Pourtois, Vroomen, & Bachoud-Levi, 2000).       
As suggested here above, the observation that crossmodal influences (from the face to 
the voice and vice versa) during emotion perception are observed although the 
participants were instructed to ignore one of the two modalities (i.e. crossmodal bias 
effect) can be taken as evidence, at least partly (see Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977) that 
multisensory perception of emotion is automatic and does not depend upon the 
availability of attentional resources. However, even if the instructions are to a ignore 
stimulus in one modality and attend to the concurrent emotional stimulus in the other 
modality, it may well be that it is actually difficult to ignore this former stimulus and 
modality (e.g. because of an intrinsic “sensory” dominance for example). Indeed, 
research on attention has clearly shown that irrelevant/unattended visual stimuli may be 
particularly hard to ignore under low-load conditions, when the specified task consumes 
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more attentional capacity (Lavie, 1995, 2005). Hence, one may speculate that in the 
case of crossmodal influence from the face (which has to be ignored) to the voice, it 
may be hard to ignore the face, a highly biologically relevant visual stimulus, despite the 
instructions, due to the low-load nature of the experimental situation (i.e. the emotional 
facial expression was the only visual stimulus present and the task required an 
identification of the affective tone of voice, see De Gelder & Vroomen, 2000). 
Interestingly, this issue was actually addressed in a different study (Vroomen, Driver, & 
de Gelder, 2001). The authors used a dual-task paradigm asking participants either to 
add two digits presented visually together (i.e. high load) while judging the affective tone 
of voice (presented simultaneously with a congruent or incongruent emotional facial 
expression), or simply detect zeros in a rapidly presented sequence of digits shown 
visually (i.e. low load) while performing the same task. Moreover, in a third condition, 
they also gave a secondary auditory task to participants, consisting of deciding whether 
a tone was high or low (i.e. low load) while judging the emotion from the voice. This 
experimental design allowed the authors to test whether the crossmodal bias effect from 
the face to the voice was (load) attention dependent or not, i.e. would be reduced by 
either a secondary auditory task or by a secondary visual task, the latter which could be 
either easy or more difficult. Results showed that the crossmodal bias effect was 
actually independent of whether or not subjects performed a demanding additional 
(distracting) task. In all three cases, the visible static emotional face had a reliable 
impact on judgments of the heard emotional voices. Moreover, the systematic influence 
of the seen emotional facial expression on judgments of the emotional tone of the heard 
voice was not eliminated under conditions of high load (see Vroomen et al., 2001). 
These behavioral results therefore confirmed that multisensory perception of emotion is 
automatic to some extent, since it arises regardless of the attentional demands imposed 
by an additional task (see Lavie, 2005). 
4 Multisensory perception of emotion vs. emotion stimulus redundancy 
4.1 Introduction 
The behavioral evidence reviewed so far is consistent with the notion that the 
perceptual system integrates emotional information from the face and the voice, 
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probably at an early/pre-attentive stage following stimulus onset (see Pourtois et al., 
2000). Indeed, one may speculate that the ability to combine multiple inputs from 
different sensory sources is advantageous for an organism in the case of affect 
perception, as it appears to be the case for other forms of multisensory perception (e.g. 
speech or space perception). But reasonably, in the absence of any limits on which 
inputs make “good” pairings, such a theoretical advantage would be quickly lost, to 
some extent. Yet, still little is known about possible constraints on affective pairings and 
on the possible role that such constraints may play when turning to the case of 
multisensory perception of emotion. This question is therefore somehow related to the 
selectivity of the crossmodal bias effect during emotion perception, as reviewed here 
above (see also de Gelder et al., 2002). Two extremes, but equally plausible 
alternatives, may be suggested in this respect. Either the crossmodal bias between the 
voice and the face during emotion perception actually reflects the existence of a general 
mechanism for affect perception whereby the perceptual system (blindly) samples and 
merges all sources of affect information available at a given moment (time) and position 
(space) (Borod et al., 2000). Or alternatively, the crossmodal bias effect during emotion 
perception is narrowly restricted to the combination of an emotional facial expression 
with an effective tone of voice, and this specific audio-visual situation requires selective 
(perceptual) mechanisms (see Pourtois & de Gelder, 2002; Pourtois et al., 2005). For 
example, we do not know if task irrelevant stimuli presented in the periphery, like for 
example an additional emotional facial expression or a written emotion word, would not 
have a comparable influence on emotional ratings of a central emotional facial 
expression, just like the affective prosody in a concurrent voice does (see De Gelder & 
Vroomen, 2000). If the crossmodal bias effect would present some of the same 
characteristics as for example the interference effect observed in Stroop-like tasks (see 
MacLeod, 1991), it would slow-down rather than speed up the response to the central 
target emotional face stimulus. Hence, unconstrained integration (i.e. occurring 
regardless of the object or content) would probably expose the organism to vicarious 
influences away from the main task at hand. 
In a series of behavioral studies, we actually addressed this question of selectivity and 
compared the crossmodal bias effect (from the voice to the face) during emotion 
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perception to other cases of pairings or emotion stimulus redundancy (while keeping the 
sensory modality – vision - constant). Either a central emotion expression was paired 
with a congruent or incongruent affective tone of voice (audio-visual integration of 
emotion), or instead with another/distracting congruent or incongruent emotional facial 
expression (visual redundancy, see Marzi et al., 1986; Miniussi et al., 1998). Likewise, 
we also looked at the pairing of the central emotional facial expression with a distracting 
written emotion word, shown at the same unattended spatial location. We predicted that 
the crossmodal bias effect would be qualitatively different, relative to these two other 
instances of emotion redundancy (“intramodal” bias). More specifically, we surmised a 
facilitation for congruent bimodal face-voice parings during emotion perception (see De 
Gelder & Vroomen, 2000), whereas the presentation of an additional emotional facial 
expression or written emotion word would primarily slow down perceptual decision 
during incongruent pairings, consistent with an interference effect (see MacLeod, 1991). 
Such an asymmetric outcome would indicate that multisensory perception of emotion 
cannot simply be assimilated to a case of emotion stimulus redundancy, and that there 
is more to gain for the perceptual system in the simultaneous presentation of a face and 
a voice during emotion perception, than the mere juxtaposition of multiple/redundant 
emotional stimuli within the same sensory modality (here with a focus on vision and 
emotion face stimuli).             
4.2 Methods 
Thirty-one adult participants (mean age: 20) were instructed to discriminate the emotion 
expression (angry vs. sad) of a central target face. This central target face was 
presented either alone, or accompanied by an affective distracter. This distracter could 
be either auditory (an angry or sad tone of voice), or visual (the written name of an 
emotion word or another face). Following standard practice, (see Driver, 1996; 
Bertelson, 1999), we manipulated the emotional congruence between the target face 
and the affective information presented concurrently and to be ignored. We used a 
within-subject design, the same procedure and stimulus duration of the central target 
face across the different conditions. Notably, the effect of the auditory distracter on 
emotion face perception was studied in a separate block than the effect of the visual 
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distracters (either a written emotion name or an emotional facial expression). Note that 
only emotions with a negative valence, i.e. angry and sad, were used, in order to avoid 
possible confounds in the interpretation between the role of (in)congruence between 
affective content of target and distracter, and actual valence of the emotion displayed 
(positive vs. negative). 
The target face (5 cm width x 6.5 cm height) consisted of the static black and white 
photograph of one out of six actors, posing either a sad or an angry emotional facial 
expression (see Ekman & Friesen, 1976) and was briefly presented in the center of a 
17-inch screen for 150 ms. Auditory stimuli were 12 different spoken words always with 
the same neutral content (/plane/) pronounced by semi-professional actors, either with a 
sad or angry affective tone of voice (see Pourtois et al., 2000; Pourtois et al., 2002; 
Pourtois et al., 2005 for additional details regarding these previously validated auditory 
stimuli). Mean duration of the auditory fragments was 348 ms. Based on the emotion 
content of the face and the voice, congruent and incongruent audio-visual pairs were 
created. The spoken distracter was always presented at such a time that its offset 
coincided with that of the central face stimulus (duration of 150 ms). Face distracters 
were identical to the targets. All combinations involved two pictures of the same actor, 
displaying the same emotion (thus twice the same picture) on congruent trials, or 
different emotions on incongruent trials. The emotional face distracter was presented in 
full synchrony with the target face, 5 cm above it (distance from the screen was 60 cm). 
Emotion written words were two adjectives (/ANGRY/ vs. /SAD/, in French) printed in 
Times police 24 (3 cm width x 1 cm height). Like for the distracting face, the distracting 
word was presented synchronously with the central emotional face, 5 cm above it. 
Congruent and incongruent trials were created based on the (mis)match between the 
emotion displayed by the central face and that conveyed by the written word briefly 
presented in the upper visual field. 
The experimental session included control trials during which the central target face was 
presented alone (no distracter) and trials during which it was accompanied by a 
distracter, in random order. All trials started with the presentation of a fixation cross in 
the center of the screen for 250 ms, followed by a 600 ms blank screen, and then the 
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presentation of the central target face for 150 ms. Such a short stimulus presentation for 
the emotional face presumably reduced peripheral eye explorations (e.g. vertical 
saccades back and forth between the two positions in the visual field). At the offset of 
the central target face, the screen went blank again for 1200 ms (allowing registration of 
the actual response made by the participant), before the next trial started. Participants 
were instructed to perform a two-alternative forced choice task about the actual 
emotional expression (sad vs. angry) of the central emotional face, and to respond as 
accurately and as fast as possible by pressing one of two keys of a response pad with 
their dominant hand. They were explicitly told to base their response only on the 
emotional target face, and to ignore either the auditory or visual distracter (either a face 
or a written word). The testing included two main blocks. In one block, control trials 
(n=60) were intermixed with audio-visual trials (n=120, 60 per level of congruence). In 
the other, control trials (n=60) were intermixed with visual-redundant trials (n=240, 60 
per type of distracter and per level of congruence). The order of the two blocks was 
counterbalanced across participants. Within each block and across participants, trial 
order was randomized.       
4.3 Results 
For the audio-visual condition/block, a repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with two factors (Emotion of the central face and Trial type) was computed on 
mean error rates (mean error rate was 15%). This analysis disclosed a significant main 
effect of trial type ([F(2,60)=6.15, p<.005], with no significant modulation by emotion. 
Post-hoc comparisons (based on paired t-tests) showed that congruent trials produced 
on average less discrimination errors than control [t30=3.37, p<.005] and incongruent 
[t30=2.52, p=.014] trials. The difference between control and incongruent trials was not 
significant [t30<1]. The statistical analysis carried out on mean RTs (for correct 
discriminations only) basically revealed a similar outcome, indicated by a clear RT 
facilitation for congruent audio-visual pairs, relative to either control trials (i.e. emotional 
face alone) or incongruent audio-visual trials (see Figure 1A). This analysis revealed a 
significant effect of trial type [F(2,60)=12.3, p<.001], with no reliable modulation by the 
emotion content of the face. Post-hoc comparisons confirmed faster perceptual 
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decisions for congruent audio-visual trials, relative to control trials [t30=2.47, p=.016] or 
incongruent audio-visual trials [t30=2.49, p=.016]. There was therefore no speed-
accuracy trade-off, as participants responded faster and made less errors for congruent 
audio-visual trials compared to the other conditions (emotional face alone or emotional 
face combined with an incongruent affective tone of voice). More importantly, these 
behavioral results confirmed a systematic and significant crossmodal bias effect from 
the to be ignored voice to the attended face (see De Gelder & Vroomen, 2000), 
indicated by a facilitation of the ratings/perceptual judgments of the central emotional 
face when it was accompanied by a congruent affective tone of voice (Figure 1A). 
Central to the present investigation is the question whether a similar facilitatory 
perceptual effect could be observed when the same central emotional face is no longer 
combined with an affective tone of voice, but instead with another “distracting” 
emotional face or a written emotion word. 
Results obtained for the other block (visual-redundant trials) show a very different 
outcome (see Figure 1B). First, the 2 (Emotion) x 2 (Congruence) x 2 (trial type: written 
word vs. face) ANOVA performed on mean error rates did not yield any significant 
effect. By comparison, the ANOVA performed on mean RTs disclosed a significant 
effect of Congruence [F(1,30)=25.85, p<.001], as well as a significant interaction 
between Emotion and Congruence [F(1,30)=9.78, p<.005]. However, this significant 
effect of congruence clearly indicated slower RTs with incongruent trials than either 
control or congruent trials (Figure 1B), and this effect turned out to be larger for sad 
faces than angry faces. Moreover, this significant interference effect was found to be the 
same, regardless of the nature of the affective distracter, either an emotional face or a 
written emotion word (Figure 1B).                
4.4 Discussion 
Based on previous results and findings (see De Gelder & Vroomen, 2000; Pourtois et 
al., 2005), we predicted that a gain in accuracy and response latencies (RT) would be 
observed when an emotional facial expression had to be judged as part of a 
multisensory emotion object (i.e. audio-visual pairing). Results of this study confirmed 
this prediction. However, when the exact same emotional target face stimuli were rated 
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in the presence of a concurrent distracting emotional face or visual emotion word, there 
was also a reliable influence from this latter unattended visual stimulus on the ratings of 
the central face, but from a different nature (compare Figure 1A to Figure 1B). Unlike 
what we found for face-voice pairs during emotion perception, when emotional visual 
distracters are congruent with the central emotional face targets, they do not facilitate or 
enhance the perceptual processing of these targets. Instead, these visual emotional 
distracters have a negative impact on response latencies when they carry an 
incongruent emotional meaning, relative to the central visual target. Taken together, 
these behavioral results somehow suggest a special status for face-voice combinations 
during emotion perception, relative to the mere redundancy of emotion information 
within the same (visual) sensory modality. As reviewed here above, it has been argued 
that facilitation or enhancement of responses/decisions to a target (i.e. perceptual 
“benefit”) presented together with a congruent distracter may be indicative of perceptual 
integration between the two inputs (see Miller, 1982; Stein & Meredith, 1993; Massaro, 
1998; Marzi et al., 1986; Miniussi et al., 1998). In contrast, a response “cost” associated 
with the presence of incongruent distracters inevitably evokes response competition (or 
response bias) phenomena, such as typically observed in the well-known Stroop effect 
(MacLeod, 1991). 
More generally, these new behavioral results suggest a general mechanism for within-
modality perception of affect (as the effect was the same for the unattended additional 
emotional face and the emotional written word), and are therefore consistent with the 
computational model of perception proposed by Massaro (1998). However, the new 
critical result is that in this condition (emotion stimulus redundancy within the same 
sensory modality), congruent trials are processed the same way as control trials (face 
alone, see Figure 1B), and therefore this interference effect is substantially different 
from the response facilitation observed with audio-visual pairings during emotion 
perception (see Figure 1A). In other words, emotion congruence across the concurrent 
inputs (face + face or face + word) does not lead to a gain in response latencies, but 
incongruence leads to a processing cost, whose origin is likely to be found at the level 
of the selection of the motor response (i.e. post-perceptual effect) and which may be 
dependent upon the availability of attentional resources (see Talsma et al., 2010). 
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Indeed, these findings may be compatible with a relatively late response competition 
view between visual stimuli, such as postulated previously in other interference 
situations (see MacLeod, 1991). These results therefore suggest a dissociation between 
the combinatory processes unifying an emotional face with a concurrent affective tone 
of voice (see Pourtois et al., 2005), and those underlying the perception of multiple or 
redundant visual emotional stimuli. Whereas the former may depend on perceptual, 
possibly even pre-attentive mechanisms (see also de Gelder et al., 2002; de Gelder et 
al., 2004), the latter may reflect another class of integration processes which do not rely 
so much on perceptual mechanisms, and which in turn may be influenced by higher 
order cognitive processes, including decision making and selective attention (Talsma et 
al., 2010).    
A potential objection is that the response facilitation found with audio-visual pairs during 
emotion perception may be somehow a consequence of the auditory component in the 
pairing, rather than the affective congruence of the central emotion face stimulus with 
this emotional auditory distracter. For example, with distracters that are in the same 
modality as the central target, they may not produce any facilitatory effect due to an 
attentional bottleneck phenomenon (see Pashler, 1994; Marois & Ivanoff, 2005). This 
alternative interpretation is unlikely though, because prior behavioral studies have 
shown that the crossmodal bias effect during emotion perception was not altered by a 
secondary task, even if this latter actually required extra processing load in either the 
visual or auditory modality (see Driver, 1996; Vroomen et al., 2001; Lavie, 2005). 
Hence, a putative limitation of processing resources does not seem to be a critical factor 
hampering multisensory perception of emotion (see also Pourtois et al., 2005; Pourtois 
et al., 2000).                 
5 General Conclusions 
Sensory modalities are traditionally characterized by the type of physical stimulation 
they are more sensitive to, light for vision, sound for hearing, skin pressure for touch, 
molecules in the air for smell, etc (Mesulam, 1998). This approach to the study of 
perception does not do justice to natural beginnings of perception. Indeed, in most of 
the cases, the organism is confronted with different sensory inputs often taking place at 
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the same time and place, and the perceiver reports objects with multiple sensory 
attributes. Hence, in many natural situations, different senses receive more or less 
simultaneously correlated information about the same object or event. The sensory 
specificity does not correspond either to what usually happens at the other extreme of 
the perception process, namely the perceiver’s intuition that after perceiving or 
recognizing an object or event, or after remembering or imagining it, different sensory 
modalities are intimately linked with one another. In line with this notion of sensory 
specificity, there seems to be a sort of general consensus in the field about the 
assumption that information from primary and modality specific cortices is combined in 
heteromodal areas of the brain (see Stein & Meredith, 1993; Mesulam, 1998; G. A. 
Calvert, 2001; Ethofer et al., 2006), an integration process that eventually yields 
multisensory-determined objects. 
In this chapter, we have reviewed evidence from behavioral studies and cognitive 
models showing that the perception of emotion can be qualified as an object-based 
multisensory phenomenon. Emotional facial expression and affective tone of voice do 
combine during emotion perception to eventually yield strong perceptual effects, which 
can be distinguished from the mere redundancy of emotional signals within a given 
sensory modality (here with a focus on the visual modality). This multisensory 
phenomenon is likely to be an early perceptual, maybe pre-attentive integration effect, 
which does not resemble behavioral manifestations of emotion stimulus redundancy, for 
which a clear-cut post-perceptual cost, rather than a perceptual benefit was observed in 
our study. On the other hand, this observation does not contradict the notion that 
selective attention mechanisms can boost or alter multisensory perception effects (see 
Talsma et al., 2010), but under certain laboratory circumstances at least, the 
combination of an emotional facial expression with a concurrent affective tone of voice 
can take place irrespective of the fact that stimulus content in one modality is directly 
ignored (unattended), or attentional load is reliably increased (see Vroomen et al., 
2001).  
As we have argued throughout this chapter, this audio-visual integration during emotion 
perception rests on an argument of adaptiveness. The combination of complementary 
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affective information conveyed by multiple channels is probably adaptive, because it 
can reduce the effects of potentially adverse factors like drifts or intrinsic noise on 
perceptual performance. But in the absence of any limitations, multisensory perception 
would be rather inefficient to deal with these natural variations. The new behavioral 
results presented in this chapter are in line with this assumption and previous studies 
(see De Gelder & Vroomen, 2000), as they show that the combination of an emotional 
facial expression with an affective tone of voice does not reflect a general (amodal) 
perceptual effect (see Massaro, 1998; Massaro & Egan, 1996; Borod et al., 2000), but 
instead it may serve a specific optimization function for the organism, aimed at binding 
selectively visual and non-lexical (psycho-acoustic) auditory cues during emotion 
perception, as these two cues usually convey simultaneously and naturistically critical 
and converging emotional information about the actual mental state, and possible 
intentions or action tendencies of peers or conspecifics (Frijda, 1989). For this reason, 
is the combination of multisensory inputs during emotion perception probably a key 
perceptual process relying on specific cognitive processes and neural systems (see 
Pourtois et al., 2005), likely sharing similarities with other multisensory objects, including 
space perception (see Bertelson, 1999), even though this conjecture remains largely 
speculative at this stage and it would need some direct confirmation at the empirical 
level as well.             
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1. (A) Mean RTs (± 1 S.E.M) obtained during the block containing control trials 
(emotional face only) intermixed with either congruent or incongruent audio-visual trials 
(emotional face + affective tone of voice). Results show a facilitation of perceptual 
decisions for the central emotional face stimulus, when this face stimulus was paired 
with a congruent (though unattended) affective tone of voice. (B) Mean RTs (± 1 S.E.M) 
obtained during the block containing control trials (emotional face only) intermixed with 
either congruent or incongruent within-modality redundant trials. The visual distracter 
was either an emotion written word, or another, secondary emotional facial expression 
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(always shown at a fixed location in the upper visual field). Results show an interference 
effect created by the presentation of an incongruent (though unattended) affective 
distracter, as opposed to a benefit in perceptual processing when the exact same 
emotional face was paired with a congruent affective tone of voice.  
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